Deep Dive - Invading Taiwan: An Island Nightmare

The prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has worried policymakers for decades. According to Sinologist Kerry Brown, whether China will invade is the greatest geopolitical question of the 21st century. The impacts of such a confrontation would extend far beyond the island, with far-reaching implications for global security, trade, and the balance of power. Such a war risks pitting the world’s two largest economies against one another, introducing the risk of a potential nuclear escalation.

Western nations will never truly understand the importance of Taiwan to China. Its significance is magnified by history and entwined with China’s national identity and political legitimacy. While Beijing has expressed a preference for peaceful reunification, officials have repeatedly stressed their right to resort to force. Chinese President Xi Jinping has called reunification with Taiwan the “essence” of the country’s “rejuvenation”, which must be achieved by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. However, US military officials have been sounding the alarm that China could invade as early as 2027.

In May 2025, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hesgeth warned that Beijing was "credibly preparing to potentially use military force to reorder the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific” and that any attempt by China to “conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world". Naval analyst Ian Easton has similarly urged leaders: “Make no mistake, this is not a PRC bluff—the threat to Taiwan is real and grave”.

An Island Fortress: The Challenge Ahead for China

While it is understandable that fears concerning an invasion are growing, the fact remains that, to date, such an operation has not been initiated in the 75 years since the end of the Chinese Civil War. Although China has invested heavily in developing formidable military capabilities, an attack on Taiwan would be “the most complex military operation in modern history”.

One major physical challenge is the Taiwan Strait, separating China from Taiwan by roughly 100 miles of open water. For island nations, a maritime barrier can be a strategic lynchpin during wartime. A striking example came during World War II, when the English Channel saved Britain by stopping a German Blitzkrieg and allowing the world’s strongest Navy to hold the line. Despite the technological sophistication of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), geography still plays an important role in making Taiwan a challenging island to invade. Any Chinese invasion force would be highly observable and vulnerable to Taiwanese forces while making the journey across the strait. In all likelihood, had the Taiwan Strait been half its current width, China would probably have taken the island a long time ago.

Additionally, with the region experiencing two monsoon seasons, a summer period from May to September and a Winter monsoon from November to March, a seaborne invasion is only viable for a few months out of the year. This adds a further layer of predictability that works to Taipei’s strategic advantage. Considering the dedication of Taiwan’s naval and air power to repelling an assault, even under ideal conditions, an opposed crossing of the strait would be fraught with challenges. As with Russian troop movements before the invasion of Ukraine, satellite imagery would mean that any military buildup along China’s east coast would be obvious. Sea mines would be deployed, fighter jets scrambled, and naval forces mobilised.

Should enough Chinese forces successfully cross the strait to mount an offensive on the island, the PLA would then face the unenviable task of orchestrating the landing. Most analysts agree that Taiwan’s west coast would be the primary target as it is where the island’s major cities, more navigable rivers, and relatively accessible terrain are found. The mountainous terrain and rugged cliffs that dominate the east make the opposite side a more difficult option. Either way, Taiwanese leaders have stated their intention to be prepared for an attack on all sides. In a May 2023 report delivered to Taiwan’s legislative body, then-Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-Cheng explained that there would be “no front or rear” in a potential invasion, meaning Taiwan must prepare to defend itself on all sides.

Demonstrating the country’s preparations for slowing a Chinese advance, in March 2025, Taiwan held its first-ever anti-landing combat drills, deploying oil barrels, floating platforms, explosives, mines, and anti-tank Czech hedgehogs. Additionally, with a lack of deep-water ports and beaches suitable for large-scale amphibious landings, the shallow coastal waters would likely force Chinese ships to anchor far offshore. By prolonging the time required to transfer troops and equipment, Chinese forces would be left exposed to strikes from Taiwanese missiles and artillery. Anti-ship missiles, including the Hsiung Feng III and Harpoon, together with systems such as the Howitzer rocket artillery, would unleash a concentrated barrage against Chinese ships and landing craft, inflicting significant casualties. Some of the weapons systems in Taiwan’s arsenal, such as the Thunderbolt-2000 wheeled MLRS system, were designed specifically “with the intention of attacking enemy forces when disembarking from (the) sea” in mind.

If China can overwhelm Taiwan’s coastal defences, troops would then have to overcome challenging terrain to move inland and secure the island. While the steepest mountains are concentrated in the east, with the Central Mountain Range running from north to south, navigating the terrain would be a necessary evil to achieve victory. One major reason for this is that even if the coastal cities fall, Taiwanese forces could turn to the mountains to wage a guerrilla warfare campaign. Although mountain warfare would not be a first choice for China, it may ultimately be unavoidable. Additionally, as a highly mountainous island with many rivers, Taiwanese soldiers could sabotage bridges, narrow passes, and tunnels to significantly slow the advance.

The mountain range also provides a unique natural barrier for the Taiwanese armed forces to protect military assets and infrastructure. For instance, built into the mountainside near Chiashan Air Force Base in Hualien is a network of tunnels that lead to fortified underground hangars. The facility is believed to be capable of holding up to 200 fighters, several underground power generators, medical facilities, command and control infrastructure, as well as several months’ worth of food and fuel supplies.

One particularly important aspect of Taiwan’s defensive strategy that doesn’t receive the attention it warrants is the population’s will to resist. Morale wins wars, and in Taiwan’s case, there should be little doubt concerning the population’s determination to fight. Three separate studies conducted over the past two and a half decades found that over 75% of Taiwanese respondents were prepared to fight if China invaded. Should the day arrive, the population’s preparedness to defend their homeland will play a pivotal role in determining the outcome. Taiwan’s reserve force numbers more than 1.5 million people and in May 2025, plans were announced to expand the number of reserve troops by 20,000.

Taiwan’s Military Strategy

Taiwan’s defence strategy has evolved considerably in recent decades to respond to shifting realities. One major shift occurred in 1978, when, in a bid to acknowledge geopolitical realisms and open diplomatic and economic relations, then-US President Jimmy Carter formally recognised China as the country’s legitimate government. Around the same time, the US opted to withdraw its forces from Taiwan to facilitate normalisation efforts. In response to concerns about Taiwan’s security, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979 to establish a legal framework for maintaining unofficial relations following the diplomatic shift. Crucially, the act left ambiguity regarding whether Washington would defend the island in the event of a Chinese invasion. Consequently, Taipei was forced to confront the reality that the US may choose not to intervene in a conflict. In response, the country invested in advanced US equipment, including fighter jets, tanks, helicopters, missiles, and ships.

While investing in heavy military equipment appeared to be the correct strategy at the outset, as China underwent its economic growth miracle, Beijing’s military spending grew rapidly. The result of this was the development of the Porcupine Strategy to counter the enemy’s strategy by deploying cost-effective defensive measures across the island that would inflict damage to an adversary on such a scale that it would deter an attack. By transitioning to an asymmetric defensive strategy, the intention, in the words of Taiwanese Defence Minister Kellington Koo, is to ensure “that any attempt to invade Taiwan would not only entail significant costs but also prove futile”. Throughout the 2010s, Washington encouraged Taipei to avoid purchasing expensive high-profile weapons in favour of smaller, more mobile, and cheaper alternatives that adhere to the Porcupine Strategy. Examples of these weapons systems include anti-aircraft Stinger missiles, anti-ship Harpoon missiles, as well as drones and mines.

Momentum for the Porcupine Strategy grew considerably as a result of the war in Ukraine. As a conflict that similarly pitted a military superpower against a far less resourced adversary, military leaders keenly observed developments in the conflict. The destruction of Russian military hardware at the hands of Ukrainian soldiers wielding Javelins and Stingers became symbolic of how modern, lightweight weapons can frustrate a larger invading force. As Moscow’s overwhelming advantage failed to translate to the battlefield, political support for the Porcupine Strategy increased. In September 2024, it was announced that Taipei was procuring an additional 1,985 Stingers, along with 549 launch systems and 549 identification friend-or-foe transponders.

Taipei has also prioritised developing its domestic production capability as a result of delayed US shipments, ranging from Paladin howitzers and Stinger missiles, to Abrams tanks and TOW 2B anti-tank missiles. While it is disconcerting that these weapons, which have been “highlighted by experts as a core element of the porcupine strategy”, were suffering delays, the silver lining is that it accelerated the impetus for Taiwan to invest in its own production capabilities. In 2021, the Taiwanese government passed a special military budget to improve its industrial base, with total defence spending expected to reach $20.25 billion in 2025, or 2.45% of GDP. For instance, in 2021, the Taiwanese government passed a special military budget to improve its industrial base, with total defence spending expected to reach $20.25 billion in 2025, or 2.45% of GDP. The move appears to have had its intended effect, as in March 2023, Taiwan unveiled five new types of indigenous drones. Among them were unmanned surveillance drones, including the Albatros II and Cardinal III, capable of tracking naval and land movements for extended periods using advanced AI. Then, in February 2024, Taiwan bolstered its arsenal with a new anti-drone system as part of a US$146 billion programme to enhance defence capabilities across more than 40 military bases. Additionally, in April 2025, reports emerged that Taiwan was nearing the completion of its first domestically built submarine, the Hai Kun, otherwise known as the Narwhal. Equipped with advanced combat systems, including multiple torpedo launchers, the submarines mark a major leap in Taiwan’s indigenous defence manufacturing and will bolster maritime security.

Taiwan has also seen progress in domestically developed ammunition. In May 2025, reports suggested that the new tungsten-core round, specially designed to penetrate PLA body armour, was ready to begin mass production. One month earlier, in April 2025, sources revealed that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence was preparing a new automated production line costing US$431.23 million to meet increasing demand for 155mm artillery shells. There will also be a greater focus on 120mm shells for M1A2T tanks.

Will They or Won’t They: US Intervention

Among his many pithy remarks, Winston Churchill once famously quipped: “You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing…after they have exhausted all the other possibilities”. If, in this context, the “right thing” is direct military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf, the unfortunate reality is that Taiwan may not have the luxury of waiting. While former US President Joe Biden repeatedly asserted that US troops would defend Taiwan if China attacked, due to the ambiguity concerning the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, there is no legal obligation for Washington to intervene.

While there is good reason to believe the US would involve itself in some capacity, the current transactional Trump administration appears determined to keep all options on the table and observe events before committing to a course of action. For example, when questioned on the matter in February 2025, Trump answered, “I never comment on that. I don't want to ever put myself in that position”, adding that “I don’t want to reveal my cards”. With the Vietnam War, the Gulf wars, and the various campaigns associated with the War on Terror living in the collective memory, the US is currently going through a non/limited-interventionist phase. Putting US military lives on the line again is a decision the current administration would be reluctant to make. Such an option is made particularly unattractive given the significant risks of a direct conflict with China, as a nuclear power and the world’s second-largest economy.

If the US chooses to intervene, Taiwan’s management of the early stages of the conflict will be particularly important in determining Washington’s response. If the country were swept away and Taipei’s chances of surviving appeared slim, the likelihood of US intervention would decrease significantly. Additionally, should the US intervene, the shape that US involvement takes remains uncertain. If direct conflict with another nuclear power is deemed too risky, Washington could opt to support Taiwan through funding and arms supplies, mirroring the approach taken with Ukraine. In recent years, the US has been stockpiling military equipment in warehouses across the region to ensure faster supply capabilities during a conflict or crisis.

The Wider International Response:

The US isn’t the only external actor with an interest in seeing Taiwan survive a Chinese invasion. With such a conflict destined to carry significant security implications, several other countries in the region are likely to play various roles. Among the countries with the greatest interest are the “crescent of defence” nations of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Although the term “crescent of defence” is used to refer to the trio as a collective front engaged in regional defence efforts against China, as with the US, the extent to which these countries would seek to become embroiled in a China-Taiwan conflict remains unclear.

It could be reasonably expected that Japan would implement a robust response, considering Tokyo’s concerns around Beijing’s intentions. After all, successive Japanese leaders have warned that Taiwan could be the next Ukraine, with former Japanese Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, citing Ukraine as one of the main reasons for tripling Japan’s defence budget to 43 trillion yen. However, with Japan’s post-World War II constitution renouncing war and its Self-Defence Forces existing only to defend Japanese territory, it appears unlikely that Tokyo would directly militarily intervene. As an alternative, Japan could offer logistical support, strengthen security ties with allies, impose sanctions, and pursue diplomatic avenues to make life difficult for China. Arguably, the most important role it could play would be to permit the US to use its military bases in Japan for military purposes during the invasion. While the US-Japan security alliance permits Washington to use Japanese territory for military bases such as that in Okinawa, using them in combat requires Tokyo's blessing. This permission would prove pivotal for the US’ response

Concerning South Korea, there is evidence suggesting that the majority of the public favours assisting Taiwan in a conflict. According to one research study, 64.5% of South Koreans supported providing direct or indirect support for US efforts to defend Taiwan. However, it remains unclear exactly what this would entail, particularly if the US didn’t act. The country has gained a reputation for being one of the more cautious among the US’ allies. Furthermore, newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is anticipated to pursue a more balanced approach to US-China relations compared with former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who favoured US alignment. While on the campaign trail, Lee even commented: “Why get involved in whether China and Taiwan fight? That has nothing to do with us”.

The Philippines has taken a different stance compared with South Korea, as encapsulated by Filipino Military Chief General Romeo Brawner’s recent assertion that “if something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved”, adding that “we should have that mentality that we are already at war”. Considering that the Philippines is acutely aware of the dangers posed by China from its clashes with Beijing in the South China Sea, this mindset is unsurprising. Given the evolving situation in the Taiwan Strait, the Philippines is preparing for all contingencies, including “reprising its role as a US support base, creating and participating proactively in an international coalition, or actively responding to the situation in its capacity”.

Beyond the Indo-Pacific, several European powers also maintain an interest in safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. As European defence spending rises, countries could “supply munitions, drones, and other relevant systems to Taiwan, the United States, or Japan, and thus indirectly assist a broader allied effort in defence of Taiwan”. However, with the war in Ukraine providing a more immediate threat and the significant distance between Europe and Taiwan, direct military involvement would be logistically challenging. Many European countries’ economic dependence on China would act as a further deterrence. Other contextual considerations, such as the nature of US involvement and how the conflict unfolds, will also be influential.

It is likely that Australia would align with Taiwan’s other allies should they choose to act. Canberra’s longstanding concerns about China’s intentions and impact on regional security are well-documented. This support could take the form of intelligence sharing, logistical assistance, and potentially naval and air force deployments in coordination with US operations, as well as economic and humanitarian aid to Taiwan.

New Delhi’s response is a factor that rarely receives the recognition it warrants during the debate around a Taiwan invasion. Despite the escalating Sino-Indian strategic rivalry, New Delhi’s longstanding policy of non-alignment suggests that a cautious, less direct approach may be taken. However, with such an invasion poised to threaten New Delhi’s national security within the broader regional landscape by reshaping great power dynamics, as well as its economic interests, given India’s reliance on regional trade, there are grounds to anticipate some form of response. This could involve diplomatic pressure and potentially using India’s growing economic influence to punish China through sanctions and trade restrictions.

It is important to acknowledge that foreign intervention works both ways. For instance, while the US and its allies are likely to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, countries such as North Korea and Russia could lend support to Beijing. China could compel Pyongyang to force the US to fight on two fronts by inducing North Korea to launch localised provocations at the same time as it invades Taiwan. Considering China’s support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine through supplying dual-use materials, military equipment, and economic assistance, Moscow is likely to return the favour as long as doing so doesn’t impact their ongoing campaign in Ukraine. The Kremlin could provide military, economic, and political support to Beijing.

How to pull it off

While China possesses a growing stockpile of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons, the risks of a nuclear escalation strongly suggest that Beijing would rely on conventional military force to achieve its objectives. It is widely anticipated that the operation to invade Taiwan would be amphibious and of a scale and complexity surpassing that of D-Day during World War II. In no uncertain terms, the feat would be “an extraordinarily complex military operation, synchronising air, land, and sea power as well as electronic and cyberwarfare”. Unfortunately for Beijing, history has proven that a major opposed amphibious landing operation is among the most difficult, having last been accomplished during the United States’ attack on Inchon in South Korea in 1950. Although an invasion could be launched in any number of ways and whatever plan Chinese leaders have could look very different when tested in real-world conditions, Beijing can adopt certain strategies to improve its chances of success.

The first consideration should be timing. In addition to obvious considerations, such as avoiding the monsoon seasons, it would be pertinent for Beijing to also account for the broader geopolitical landscape in deciding when to pull the trigger. For instance, China could time the invasion to be as disadvantageous as possible for the US by attacking when Washington’s foreign policy is stretched thin. As the US is preoccupied with wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, many have voiced their fears that the current period is a window of opportunity for Beijing. Given their potential roles, China is also likely to factor in the dynamics within the crescent of defence countries as part of its strategic calculations.

It is also looking increasingly possible that Beijing could attempt to disguise an invasion as a military drill. Recognising this threat, US Navy Admiral Paparo has warned that: “We’re very close to that (point) where on a daily basis the fig leaf of an exercise could very well hide operational warning”. China’s training operations have grown both in frequency and scale. In October 2024, after Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te delivered a National Day address in which he vowed to resist annexation by Beijing, China deployed planes and ships to encircle Taiwan. The PLA held a total of nine drills around the island: two on the east coast, three on the west coast, one to the north, and three around the Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast. Given the operational scale of a war with Taiwan, China may struggle to stage enough rehearsals of a comparable scale to conceal the real thing.

With China’s drills regularly involving the encirclement of the island, most analysts agree that a Chinese blockade is likely to play a role. Should this occur, the US and its allies would find it far more difficult to resupply Taiwan compared to Ukraine due to the absence of ground routes from neighbouring countries. A blockade thus exemplifies how China could use Taiwan’s island geography to its advantage, potentially forcing its allies to rely on a cumbersome, Berlin airlift–style operation to supply Taipei.

Regarding the attack phase, many hold that this would begin with an initial barrage on key infrastructure such as military bases and ports to impede Taiwan’s response capability. By targeting critical nodes such as power, water, and communications, China could crush Taiwan’s capacity to coordinate its defence and undermine public morale from the outset. Energy infrastructure appears to be a particular focus for China, with a recent PLA simulation (code-named Strait Thunder 2025A) involving precision strikes on a Taiwanese LNG facility.

Beijing is also likely to target undersea cables to disrupt communications and sow panic among the public. On 12 June 2025, a Taiwanese court handed a three-year prison term to a Chinese captain for cutting an undersea cable connecting Taiwan and the Penghu islands. Although authorities found the captain to be negligent due to a lack of evidence to prove intentional sabotage, many suspect Beijing of being responsible. The incident came just one month after the Trans-Pacific Express cable, which connects Taiwan to the US, Japan, South Korea, and China, was also damaged. On that occasion, Taiwanese authorities alleged that a Cameroon-registered, Hong Kong-owned freighter named the Shunxing-39 was responsible.

Some analysts contend that a “phased invasion” strategy would provide China with a “better prospect of success”. According to this strategy, the first phase would involve the capture of the Kinmen islands; second, the seizure of the Penghu Islands; and third, an assault on Taiwan’s west coast. This would force Taipei to face the dilemma of whether to: “Absorb casualties fighting for key terrain currently under attack or to conserve resources for a final stand on the main island”. Moreover, given that China has not engaged directly in a conflict since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, the initial two phases could be used to prepare for a final assault on the main island. It also remains possible that China could take the Kinmen Islands years in advance of conducting further operations, similar to how Russia invaded Crimea before attacking the rest of Ukraine years later. Additionally, the PLA could choose to strike all Taiwanese-held territories simultaneously to reduce warning time for the main island. However, such an operation would be logistically demanding, requiring extensive coordination across its land, air, and naval forces. A multi-front assault could also stretch China’s military too thin, undermining its ability to concentrate force where it matters most.

While the landing phase would prove extremely challenging, Taiwan’s west coast appears to be the best option available for China. Concerning specific targets, it would be logical for the PLA to focus on ports, airbases, command centres, and urban areas such as Taipei. The ports are particularly important as holding them would impact Taiwan’s naval response, disrupt reinforcements and resupply from reaching Taiwan, and greatly ease the deployment of Chinese troops, military hardware, and supplies for the conflict. The unsuitability of Taiwan’s beaches for large-scale military landings underscores the strategic importance of its ports. It is believed that fewer than 20 of Taiwan’s beaches are suitable for a landing. Even worse, the width of a typical so-called “red beach” is such that only one battalion (between 600 and 800 soldiers) can land at a time.

There is evidence that Chinese innovation could make the beaches a more viable target. In January 2025, satellite images of Shuiqiao ships were first seen during the construction phase. Then, in mid-March 2025, the Zhanjiang beach test demonstrated how they could combine to create a hulking loading dock stretching almost a kilometre out to sea. The barges, which appear to have drawn inspiration from the Mulberry harbours used during D-Day, are designed to facilitate the rapid deployment of troops and equipment from ships onto beaches and shorelines, potentially bypassing traditional beach defences. Some analysts believe they could play a pivotal role in a Taiwan invasion by “moving tanks, armoured vehicles, and the like quickly and safely onto shore”. However, others have pointed to the slow-moving nature of the barges as a key vulnerability, suggesting they would be an easy target.

Another option would be to rely on paratroopers to get onto the island. Beijing has been massively upgrading its airborne forces so that all three major services are now making regular parachute jumps. Forces are also undertaking more challenging jumps, including at night, in coastal areas, and over the water. Chinese sources confirm that the PLA could have about 450 transport aircraft poised to deliver these troops during a Taiwan invasion.

Given the concerns surrounding the beaches and the difficulties in moving forces across the island, some defence analysts believe China would focus on the capital and political centre, Taipei. With the city sitting in a bowl and ringed by mountains, access is limited to several chokepoints, including roads and tunnels, which could be destroyed along with the city’s major port to slow the Chinese advance. Upon entering Taipei, Chinese forces would be greeted with fierce resistance and street-to-street urban combat that would significantly inflate the number of military and civilian casualties.

Should the operation turn into a prolonged conflict, it will become increasingly important for China to account for the psychological dimension of warfare domestically and in Taiwan. As China grapples with numerous domestic challenges, ranging from an ageing population and shrinking workforce, to youth unemployment, a struggling property market, and a slowing economy, the public’s patience for such a war may not be significant. Should the economic costs of war hit home, such as through sanctions and blockades, discontent could spread swiftly, potentially leading to civil unrest at home. China hasn’t waited for a war scenario to get its propaganda war machine up and running. The CCP funds thousands of propagandists known as the wumao to repeat regime propaganda and swarm those critical of it. Controlling the narrative around Taiwan is a major objective of the programme.

Conclusion

During his New Year’s address in 2023, Xi Jinping stated that: “The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability”. Only time will tell if he is correct. That a country with the military strength of China has refrained from such an operation highlights how complicated and costly it truly is. Although it is unknown if or when an invasion will occur, if it does, the consequences will extend far beyond the island, with far-reaching implications for global security, trade, and the balance of power. Some argue that China could ultimately take control of Taiwan through peaceful means. After all, it may only require the election of a single pro-Beijing government in Taipei for this to happen. However, China’s been waiting for that to happen for a long time.

If Xi Jinping’s political standing weakens or China’s internal challenges deepen, the appeal of escalating tensions over Taiwan as a means of distraction could grow. Alternatively, if Beijing concludes that its military advantage over Taiwan is at its peak and that waiting would risk a shift in the strategic balance, it may be judged that it is now or never. There are multiple scenarios under which an invasion could be triggered. But just how long China is willing to wait remains unclear. Worryingly, Beijing’s patience appears to be waning.